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This study addresses how young Europeans (11 to 19 years of age, 29 countries, n=2000) construct 
identities around their country and Europe, and how they discuss nationalism and national 
identities in their discourse. Based on empirical data collected through small group deliberative 
discussions (n= 324) in 29 states), young people’s use of these terms were gathered in free-ranging 
and unstructured debate. Analysis suggests that a significant majority are sceptical about their 
‘national’ identity, and about nationalism as being significant in their futures.  While most have 
some sense of identification with their country and state, their location in increasingly diverse 
settings means that for many ‘national’ identities have little significance.   
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Von hier und heute geht eine neue Epoche der Weltgeschichte aus, und ihr könnt sagen, ihr 
seid dabei gewesen   
  
[From here and today begins a new epoch of world history, and you can say that you 
witnessed it]  
von Goethe, 1822 (1999 p. 355) 
 
Goethe’s observation was made (in his later recollection) on the evening after the Battle of Valmy, 
on the 20th September 1792, to a group of officers in the Prussian army, who had been 
unexpectedly defeated that day by the French Republican army.  Goethe was at the time a military 
observer for Duke Karl August of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach. The French had advanced to shouts of 
‘Vive la Nation’ and singing Ça Ira, the revolutionary ballad (Opello, 2016, p 108).  Never before, in 
Goethe’s estimation, had soldiers in an army declared that they were fighting for their nation, 
rather than for a leader or a monarch (Brubaker, 1996, p 1 fn1). Unknown to Goethe, on the same 
day as the battle the Revolutionary Government in Paris had declared France to be an état civil, a 
civil state: ‘from that moment on an individual could only exist as a citizen once his or her identity 
had been registered by the municipal authorities, according to regulations that were the same 
throughout the national territory’ (Noiriel, 1996 [1988] xviii).  
 
Since that time the nation state has been widely seen as the ubiquitous and significant political 
unit in international affairs. The term was often used by leading political scientists in the 1950s 
and 60s: Halle, for example, (1952) claimed that ‘a prime fact about the world is that it largely 
composed of nation-states’ (1952:10), and Rustow wrote of a world of ‘130 nations’ (1967:282), 
including the nation-states of the USSR (sic) and the United Kingdom [sic]. But this interutilization 
of nation and state was problematic. Connor described the term nation as ‘terminological chaos’ 
(1993:112). He argued the nation-state barely existed, pointing out that most modern states 
contain significant national minorities (Connor, 1978a:382). He referred to a 1971 survey of 132 
‘entities generally considered to be states’, suggesting that 120 of them had national minorities of 
a tenth or more, in 70 more than a quarter of the population were minorities, and 39 had more 
than half the population as ‘minorities’, and deplored ‘the careless use of terminology … the 
United Nations [is] an obvious misnomer’ (1978b, pp 59-60). But the term nation remains 
embedded in popular discourse, bolstered by national myths (as shown in Western Europe and 
beyond by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), and in Eastern Europe by  Hoskin and Schöpflin (1997)). 
 
Generational changes and national identities in contemporary Europe  
 
This article examines how young Europeans, aged between 12 and 19, are currently constructing 
nations and nationalism. It suggests that many of the generation born after about 1993 are 
developing a new and different understanding of nationalism, rather as Fulbook’s (2011) analysis 
of twentieth century German young people showed that there are not only significant differences 
in the ways in which generations construct political ideas, but that these are the consequence of 
political fractures and dissonance in society.  Young people’s availability for political mobilisation is 
dependant on the ‘time of transition with respect to the ways in which people can become 
involved in new regimes and societies’ (Fulbrook 2011:488).  This article suggests that the cohort 
of young Europeans born since the early 1990s will not simply turn towards their parents’ views 
and constructions of ‘the nation’ as they age: they have a collective identity based on what 
Fulbrook defines as ‘generationally defined common experiences’ (2011:11).   The age at which 
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people experience key historical moments - in Fulbrook’s study, the transitions within German 
society in 1933, 1945 and 1989 - can be critical: ‘age is crucial at times of transition, with respect 
to the ways in which people can become involved in new regimes and societies’ (2011:488). Key 
formative experiences do not ‘necessarily produce similar outcomes, but common challenges at a 
particular life stage, and … unresolved issues’ produce generational difference (emphasis in 
original 2011:9). 
 
There have been several formative experiences that have affected this generation: the 
technologies of the internet and social media, and the rapid increase in ethnic diversity, for 
example.  By 2015, over 20 per cent of EU households included at least one immigrant, regardless 
of migration generation or migration background’ (Agafiței and Ivan 2016:1), double the number 
in 2000.  Two other political changes in Europe are particularly salient with respect to 
identification with the nation and nationalism: the ending of the Cold War divisions of the 
continent (and the realisation that many of the states of Eastern Europe would become members 
of the European Union), and the creation of a European citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992.   Article 8 of the Treaty reads   
 
1.  Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of 
a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union 
2.  Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to 
the duties imposed thereby.    (CEC 1992)The Treaty of Lisbon in 2008 
added an explanatory clause to (1):  ‘Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace 
national citizenship’    (CEC 2008). 
 
This creation of a supranational construct of citizenship could be seen as the commencement of a 
‘new epoch’, just as momentous as that noted by Goethe exactly 200 years earlier, as the 
Tindemans Report (CEC 1976) on the future of the European Union had foreshadowed:  
 
Europe can and must identify itself with the concerted and better controlled pursuit of the 
common good … We will then have created a new type of society, a more democratic Europe with 
a greater sense of solidarity and humanity.      (CEC 1976:11–12) 
Duchesne (2008:405) observes that this new model of European political identity, as an imagined 
symbolic identity, drew on the constructivist analyses of national identity made by  Anderson 
(1983) and Gellner (1983). Their work challenged the primordialist model of the nation, which saw 
nationalism as an essentialist construct based on attachment to common roots and heritage, into 
which an individual was born, with particular traditions, rituals, language or religion. The nation 
was seen as ancient and natural (Herder, 2002; Van den Berghe, 1978). But, as Brass observes, 
‘there are very few groups in the world today whose members can lay any serious claim to a 
known common origin’: it is not actual descent, but a belief in a common descent (Brass 1979, 35). 
 
The social constructionist view of national identity, developed particularly by Gellner and 
Anderson, sees it as a subjective term, used to create a distinctive category. National identities 
become the construction of bonds based on presumed shared group ideas, cultural artefacts 
and emotions. Anderson (1983) describes such national identities as Imagined Communities, 
inventions or constructions that had their own particular narrative power, 
… because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow 
members, meet them, or even hear of them … The nation is imagined as limited because even the 
largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, 
boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.   (Anderson 1983:6) 
The nation thus becomes a narrative: Bhabha (1990) suggests that ‘the cultural temporality of the 
nation inscribes a much more transitional social reality … as a system of cultural signification, as 
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the representation of social life rather than the discipline of social polity’ (Bhabha:1–2). But 
Brubaker has observed that the construction of the European Union ‘was supposed to be the 
graveyard of the nation-state and modern nationalism … yet far from moving beyond the nation-
state, fin-de siècle Europe has been moving back to the nation state … into a score of nationally 
defined states’ (Brubaker 1996, p c4, emphasis as in original). He was writing here particularly with 
the states formed from the disintegration of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia: the impact 
of this on young people’s sense of nationalism in the successor states will be discussed in the 
analysis below.   
 
So the question this article addresses is how do young Europeans, members of the generation 
whose lives have been wholly within the trans-national times of a European citizenship and the 
supranational consequences of this, construct such terms as the nation and national identity? 
What narratives do they construct around the state they live in, around Europe, around ‘the 





How an individual constructs a concept such as nation or nationalism takes place in a social 
setting, and is an activity that is contingent on the particular circumstances in which the concepts 
are expressed. Most young people of school age are particularly difficult to questions about their 
understanding of a particular term, not least because they are accustomed to many of the 
questions they are asked by adults as being intended to test their knowledge. The majority of 
questions put to young people in schools are closed: the questioner knows the ‘correct’ answer, 
and the role of the young person is provide this as a response.  
 
This was a personal post-retirement research project that began in 2010 (Ross, 2015, 2019). Its 
principal objective was to examine the ways in which young people in mainland Europe, between 
the ages of 11 and 19, constructed identities for themselves that might include such entities as 
their country and Europe. I visited over 104 different towns, cities and villages (with populations 
between 500 and 13 million) in 29 European countries, and in each engaged in discussions with 
small groups of young people, talking with some two thousand of them in 324 conversations. I 
anticipated that most people do not necessarily have firm or fixed senses of identity, and how an 
individual chose to describe their identities was depend on the specific context (Bruter, 2005; 
Balescu, 2009; Anthias, 2012).  
 
My approach was to initiate small group deliberative discussions (usually about 50 minutes long), 
in which usually between five and eight young people could feel they were in command of the 
subject matter, and would discuss terms with each other, using their own vocabulary, rather than 
acting in response to a questioner. Open-ended questions were asked, often in response to what 
had been said, in order to encourage them to talk about the way that they saw their attachment to 
their locality, country, nation and state, and other possible locations that might represent a form 
of political identities. This apparent lack of structure was designed to capture and use the 
narratives the young people themselves. To that end,  I would (for example) always initial refer to 
your ‘country’, allowing them the opportunity, if they chose, to introduce terms such as ‘state’ and 
‘nation’. Only when and if this had been done might I enquire what they meant by such terms, 
through asking for examples and contexts.  
 
The research technique of group conversations (gruppendiskussionsverfahren: group discussion 
method) has been developed over in German social science investigations over the past twenty 
years (Bohnsack 2000, Loos and Schäffer, 2001). It has been described as ‘an open interview, 
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intended to let respondents develop a topic in their own language, in their symbolic system and 
their relevant framework,’ and to permit analysis that ‘avoid[s] projecting … meanings that are not 
appropriate (Bohnsack, 2000: 21, translated by Scheunpflug et al. 2016). Gugglberger et al. (2015) 
suggest this more open and elastic method when compared to more structured focus groups 
(2015). ‘Respondents can set the structures and contents of the conversation by themselves’ 
Scheunpflug et al. (2016 10), allowing them to produce ‘implicit, action-guiding knowledge … 
based and acquired in fundamental experiences … that groups of individuals share with each 
other’ (Wagener 2018 92). This was used in this study by providing narrative-generating stimuli 
that initiated discussion, beginning with immanent issues - the accounts and language group 
members used in their narratives - and only moving to exmanent questions when they had had 
developed structures relevant to them. Most discussions were largely in English: I was on every 
occasion accompanied by a local colleague, usually a social science academic, who would interpret 
either occasional phrases, or sometimes whole conversations. 
 
In order to establish a sense of agency, in which the discussion was directed and paced by the 
group, they were assured at the outset that there were no ‘right’ answers, and they should say if 
they disagreed with each other. Strategies to generate this were: 
 not to introduce leading terminology 
 to make questions transparently open (If they said they were French, I might respond 
‘What makes you French?’) 
 to accept all responses as valid 
 where possible, to construct questions that were responding to what they had said  
 to ask as few questions as possible 
 not to expect everyone to respond (not a sequential interview); and 
 to ask for examples. 
There was an initial tendency in many discussions for individuals to conform with the other 
members of the group: this rapidly changed as I accepted diverse comments, and asked if there 
were any disagreements.  There were very rarely arguments, but sometimes robust exchanges of 
view: there did not appear to be occasions where views were supressed to conform to the norm.  
 
I had extensive networks and contacts in European universities, which I used to find usually two 
schools or colleges in each location (one in a middle class residential area, one in a working class 
area). Consent was obtained from school principals, and written consent from the young people’s 
parents (all of those under 16, and older in some countries) and from the young people 
themselves. All names used here are pseudonyms. The first phase of fieldwork (2010-12) covered 
the countries that had joined the EU after 20041: a second phase (2014-16) added many of the 
pre-2004 members2. At least two places were visited in each country, and four or more in the 
larger countries. The young people participating were diverse: some 56 per cent were female, 
about half had parents in working class occupations. There were minority-origin young people in 
many discussion groups, reflecting the distribution of minorities in each country and Europe as a 
whole: by country of origin, 76.8 per cent had parents and grandparents from the country they 
were living in: of the remainder, 7.4 per cent had at least one parent/grandparent from another 
EU country, 8.4 per cent from a European country not in the EU, and 7.4 per cent from outside 
Europe (this data is based on what was volunteered in discussion). Not intended to be a 
statistically representative sample, it nevertheless gathered a range of potential views across each 
                                                 
1 Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus (Republic), Cyprus (Turkish Republic of), Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey  
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. Note that the Greece, the Irish Republic and the United Kingdom were 
not included in the study) 
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country: from different regions, social backgrounds and cultural origins. Much empirical social 
science research draws its subjects from a narrow base: Arnett (2008) estimates that 80 per cent 
of non-USA studies are drawn from psychology undergraduates in the capital city of a country. 
These are extrapolated as representative of the country (Rozin, 2001). Rochat suggests that many 
studies stress the universality of their findings, and ‘to relegate diversity to noise rather than as a 
primary object of study’ (Rochat, 2010: 107). This study was intentionally noisy, reflecting the 
diversity of these countries: with many locations beside the capital city. Within the constraints that 
the population being sampled was of young residents of these European countries (largely 
industrialised, democratic and comparatively rich), the sampling was designed to avoid the pitfalls 
analysed by Henrich et al. (2010).  
 
All discussions were recorded, and transcribed in full. The analysis that followed was partly 
grounded in the data itself – an iterative, inductive and comparative process (Glaser and Strauss 
1967; Charmaz and Belgrave 2010), but also explored specific theses identified from the literature. 
The themes that were particularly relevant for the analysis presented in this article were the 
distinction between cultural and civic components of identity (drawing on Anderson 1983; 
Brubaker 1996; Bruter 2005; Joppke 2010), generational differences (Lutz et al. 2006; Fulbrook 
2011); and the use of continuities and contingent resources (Ekström 2016). There was also some 
country-specific literature: all these were combined into a meta-analysis (Rabiee 2004:657).                       
 
Most of the young people (about 95 per cent) made a more than minimal contribution to the 
discussions, and about two thirds were fully participant. The conversations were varied in focus 
and emphasis, and my questions varied in response to their issues and vocabulary, so the mode 
remained conversational rather than interrogatory. This made responses difficult to quantify. Most 
discussions were in English, the others simultaneously translated by my local colleague.  
 
Results 
Having introduced myself – as a British researcher studying young people’s sense of identity in a 
number of European countries – I asked them to each begin by describing their own identity. This 
was partly a device to ensure everyone made a contribution at an early stage, but it also resulted 
in many of them describing themselves by referring to a country, or two or more countries. For 
example, in a Danish group of 16 and 17 year olds in the small city of Odense, Agnethe (♀ ) and Lilli 
(♀ )  introduced themselves as Danish girls, and Cæcilie  (♀ ) agreed, but added ‘I feel – very Danish 
– even though my grandfather immigrated from Scotland’. At this, Julius (♂) observed by saying 
they had said that they were Danish, rather than European: ‘so … we are nationalists’, which 
provoked general amusement. Evald  (♂) too said he felt Danish, ‘but my father, and my 
grandfathers, my grandmother, they emigrated from Germany, so I also feel some connection with 
Germany – but I feel mostly Danish’; and finally Hussein  (♂)  explained that his parents had come 
from Palestine, ‘I’m born and raised in Denmark – I don’t feel as quite as Danish as the others, I 
feel more a bit of both – I feel more European than Danish – it’s like the same culture as Arabic.’ 
 
Such points provided an opportunity to ask why they felt Danish, or ‘mostly Danish’, and this 
provoked (in this group, and in many others) discussion of a variety of explanations, that usually 
appeared to being generated at the moment, rather than having been thought about before.  
Place of birth was suggested (though many of those who had migrated said not), the country they 
were living in and whose culture they had grown up in, how they had been brought up, the 
language they spoke – but this was often with some awareness of its transience:  Lilli said ‘When I 
say I feel Danish it’s not like I feel that I belong in this country, I could easily move to another 
country.’ Hussein commented ‘people often mistakenly say that there is a clash of cultures, that 
the youngster doesn’t know where to put himself. Is he German or Danish or Palestinian or 
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something? But I see different cultures as being an advantage- you take the best of both cultures, 
the best of both identities and make your own – that’s an advantage, from my point of view.’   
At this point, Julius said that his sense of being Danish meant he had ‘a lot of people that you feel 
connected to in that way… when you’re abroad you can find Danish people and then you feel at 
home. I’m aware that it’s a social construction, and that until the eighteenth century you wouldn’t 
have had nationalities in the sense that you have it now – and I try to look away from 
nationalities.’  Cæcilie saw nationality as ‘a way of expressing ourselves when we’re abroad’, but 
she felt ‘European as well, because we have some fair rules and stuff that unites us.’   
Such an opening discussion was not atypical, and often included the suggestion that citizenship 
and nationality were a lmatter of chance: thus in Sevilla, Sancho (♂14) said ‘it’s a lottery … if you 
are born there, you love your country, and agree with the rules … then you are Spanish.’ But in 
Prilep,  Lazar (♂18) thought that he had had a poor deal: ‘we are all Macedonians, but not by our 
choice – we are unlucky to be born here. I wish I was born in Denmark because here we are 
surrounded by poverty, by corruption, and the unemployment rate is high.’ Similar points have 
been argued by Shachar (2009) and Joppke (2010): the latter observed that, far from the 
Enlightenment construct of the modern state being ‘based on a contract, the state is not a 
voluntary association’ (2010 p 16).   
 
The concepts of the nation and the state thus constitute a field, in Bourdieu’s sense as a setting in 
which different social positions are held and interact: these concepts are not unitary or fixed, but 
differentiated and possibly competitive stances that interact to determine legitimacy over the 
capital of citizenship (Bourdieu 1984; Brubaker 1996,  61). This section now examines the empirical 
evidence for the various positions and constructions of ‘the nation’ and ‘the state’ taken by these 
young people. I first consider the broad range of positions taken; then the points that were largely 
held in common by the majority of young people, before concluding with the significant contextual 
variations thrown up in particular states. 
 
Competing constructions  
 
These were brought to the fore in responses to my asking if there were things that they liked or 
disliked about what they had described as ‘their’ country. In a Swedish group of sixteen year olds 
in Stockholm, Saga  (♀ ) said she was ‘thankful for being Swedish, well, being born in Sweden – 
because we have great health care, living in Sweden is pretty good, the basic stuff,  the basic 
human rights.’ But she qualified this: the definition of who was Swedish or not had become 
politicised by  ‘what the nationalist – and pretty racist – movement is doing now – defining who’s 
Swedish and who’s not Swedish.’  Christin  (♀ ) said she ‘won’t be proud of Sweden as a whole – I’ll 
be proud of  where I grew up, and my family, and the areas that I lived in … and feel affection 
towards that – but … [not] Sweden as a whole. .. it is weird to talk about Sweden as “your 
country”’. Margreta  (♀ ) said that ‘this nationalistic movement [Sverigedemokratern] … [has] 
become very serious - I don’t want to be whatsoever identified with them … it’s become important 
to not identify myself with where I live, or where other people are from.’ 
 
Others, generally a minority, and often some of those from particular states, had a more 
essentialist view of the nation and their nationality.  For example, some young people of Serbian 
origin spoke of ‘their blood’. In Slagelse, in Denmark, Kanko (♂15) put it: ‘I’m not Danish – if you 
want to, you can feel Danish if you’re not born Danish – but I feel more like Serbian, because it’s in 
my blood – I’m connected with Denmark because I live here.’  Similar sentiments were expressed 
by some young Turks. In Çanakkale, Bugra (♂14) said that to be Turkish depended on his 
‘ideological view, on the person’s racial [iksal: blood lineage] background,’ and in the same group 
Kaan (♂13) defined ‘the Turkish man is the person who can sacrifice their life for their country, and 
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the woman is the supporter of her man.’  Comparable essentialist views were expressed by a 
minority of those of migrant origin: in  Brussels, Hassan (♂15)  said ‘I think I’m Belgian because I 
was born here, and I  grew up here – but in blood, I’m always Moroccan – I’ll never forget that and 
I’m proud of it.’  And in Estonia, some characterised and othered the Russkiye (Russian-
speaking/origin minority) in similar terms: Merilin (♀12) said ‘they have this kind of temperament.  
It’s in their blood. They are brave and courageous, and they can’t do anything about it’.  The 
essentialist stance was also sometimes expressed in terms of cultural  nationalism: in Poland 
Wojuech (♂12) said ‘we are all the Polish nation, so we should all be taught he same, and we all 
should feel the same as Poles.’ In the Slovakian town of Banská Bystrica, there was an extended 
discussion: ‘Every nation has its characteristics, some specific character traits in common,’ said 
Dominika Silke (♀16); ‘we are similar in appearance, in our body language,’ added Lenka.  In 
Croatia, an Albanian-origin young woman, Agata (Silke (♀17), was critical of the Croats:  ‘so 
national,  protective, and we have to show our flags, our identity, we have to say we’re Croatians, 
we have to say we’re from Rijeka, or from Dubrovnik or something. I don’t do that, because I’m 
both Croatian and Albanian.’ 
 
More common among young people were constructivist views of the nation (as Julius exemplified 
in Odense, and the Stockholm group, above).  In Berlin,  Silke (♀16) said she ‘I wouldn’t define 
someone by his or her nationality – in my opinion it isn’t that what makes that person, that gives 
them  an identity  -  it changes with the places you go to, and the places you like.’ In Zagreb, 
Smiljana (♀15) said nationality ‘just means to be born in a certain country, in this instance in 
Croatia, but I don’t think that the nationality is that important to your definition of who you are – 
to me what really matters is what kind of person you are inside. I don’t want anyone to think that I 
don’t love my country – I do, in a certain way -  but it doesn’t represent to me something really 
important.’  
Nationalism was occasionally perceived in highly symbolic terms.  In Turkey, the national flag is 
ubiquitous, and Ege (♂13), on a school trip to Italy from his home town of Tokat, in central 
Anatolia, was struck by the fact that ‘in Italy, there was only one flag in the garden of the school – 
and nothing on the streets, in the parks, like we have here – this shows that their nationality is 
weaker than ours.’ 
 
Some saw the nation in cultural terms, particularly in Italy. For example, in Frascati – a small town 
just outside Roma – Eusebio (♂18) said that ‘culture is the elements that characterise a nation,’ 
and Adalio (♂18) spoke of ‘all the cultural traditions that each nation has’.  In the southern town of 
Matera, culture was taken to the regional level : Lando (♂17) described Italy  as ‘a nation in which 
lived a lot of cultures- the Italian person … can’t be identified as a prototype.’ Maud (♀16)linked 
‘Italian culture and Italian history’, and historical issues were particularly employed in several 
Balkan states to differentiate particular nations from each other and the Turks: in the city of Iaşi, 
Dumitru (♂14)  said ‘I’m a nationalist, because in history [the Turks] conquered several parts of 
Romania, [they] brought bad things to this country.’   Sport could also be an element in national 
rivalry: Agata (♀17) in Rijeka (Croatia) said that ‘in football, or handball, we have to show that we 
are better. It’s meaningless, sport, but when it’s Croatia against Serbia, it’s more than sport, it’s a 
political issue,’ and Tvrtko (♂15) added ‘we are nationalist … it has a special charm when we play 




The predominance of the view that a sense of national identity was not personally important was 
striking. In the Stockholm group, Jenny’s (♀16) comment exemplifies this: ‘I identify myself as a 
girl, but my national identity is not that important to me – it’s not something I usually think of 
when I think of myself.’  But this does not mean that fellow countrymen and women who did 
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identify themselves as nationalists were ignored.  They were characterised generally as older 
people, and people from rural areas. Some young people in the more rural areas (particularly 
settlements of less than 25,000 that were not ethnically diverse) tended to be more essentialist 
and nationalistic.  
 
There were different aspects to the perceptions of a generational divide.  In the Nordic countries, 
older people’s feelings of nationalism were explained in terms of changing traditions and new 
technologies. In the Norwegian city of Bergen, Kjetil’s (♂19) rationalisation of this ‘major 
difference’ was that ‘young people have experienced the internet, social media, this huge internet 
era – and because of globalisation, we are much more close to each other than before - we get 
news from everywhere, and  I think people are becoming less and less like nationalistic – 
nationalism has decreased.’ In Malmö, Tore (♂15) observed ‘our parents and our grandparents are 
often way more nationalist than we are … we don’t share old Swedish songs and stuff.’  In 
Reykjavik, Elín (♀15) thought ‘the nation changed in the 50s and 60s … Iceland became much 
richer, people got much nicer homes, so I think my grandparents were really proud.’  Historical 
factors were also cited to explain how grandparents and parents might conceptualise the nation in 
different ways.  In Spain, for example, several young people remarked on the patriotism that some 
of their grandparents expressed as being the consequence of linger affections for the Franco 
regime. Adriana (♀12, Madrid), said ‘a lot of time has passed since our grandfathers were born – 
there have been a lot of changes in thoughts … we don’t have the experiences that our 
grandparents have, we can’t think like them.’ Aimar’s (♂12) ‘grandparents [87 and 83] lived 
through the wars and when it was Franco – they have very different ideas of those of my parents 
... they didn’t learn my grandparents’ ideas, so that’s different from what we’ve been saying to 
you.’ In Finland, the conflicts in 1939 – 1944, with the USSR and Nazi Germany, were part of Altti’s 
(♂16, Jyvaskyla) explanation: ‘Seventy years ago, people fought for this country – we haven’t seen 
that – of course they feel differently about this country when they have seen people die for it. ’In 
some other states, other specific historical reasons were advanced, which are examined in more 
detail for some states in the following sub-section.  Grandparents were particularly identified as 
different, but in many cases parents were similarly characterised. 
 
Nationalistic feelings were also associated with rural areas in many countries.  Leia (♀16, Malmö) 
described ‘villages in Sweden where it’s very conservative – “you’re not allowed to be 
homosexual, we don’t like immigrants” - in cities like Stockholm and Malmö it’s easier to be open-
minded, more people who live here are immigrants.’ In Stockholm, Isak (♂16) felt parts of Sweden 
were moving away from attitudes of tolerance: ‘we are on our way from that, to a more 
nationalist and egocentric way In the Swedish countryside [where] many people think it was much 
better before, when we had no immigrants … they want  to be really conservative …  they’ve 
created this nationalist wave’.   The same was true in Slovakia: in the provincial town of Banská 
Bystrica, Katka (♀17) observed that it was the people living outside the capital who were the most 
nationalistic. In Amsterdam, Mieke (♀15) made a similar point: the nationalists were ‘people more 
in the villages, where they only have a Chinese [Restaurant] – but always see negative things on 
TV, that image of all people from other countries [as] intruders, bad.’ In Innsbruck, Klaus (♂17) said 
‘in the Tyrol there are lots of little villages where lots of old people live, and farmers, also young 
people – and these people don’t think about the whole, they just want people from other 
countries to go back to their country.’  
 
The association made between nationalism, older people and racism was also frequently made. In 
the Danish town of Haslev, Nis (♂17) said older people may ‘be more nationalistic … because they 
have lived in Denmark longer than us, and have lived in an era when there had not been much 
interaction with the world in general. They feel more nationalistic, that they are being invaded by 
these immigrants.’ In Malmö, Tore (♂15) described the Swedish Democrat party: ‘they are 
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nationalists and very often called racists… they want to divide Swedes who are born here from 
other people. … For me, being Swedish is not about which culture you have, or where you come 
from, or actually which language you talk – actually, it’s about how you want to identify yourself. 
Nationalism has become a kind of a bad word here in Sweden right now.’ 
 
The extent to which nationalism had become a derogatory term might be indicated by the way 
that some young people used it as a way of othering other states, of whose policies they 
disagreed.  For example, the United States was differentiated from the Europe Union by Wilfried 
(♂16) in Berlin: Europe shares some political values with them, but they were ‘a special case, 
because they have  a government that is democratic but also incredibly influenced by religion … 
and nationalistic views. … When it comes to political culture, the people there are way more 
nationalistic than here.’ Russia was similarly described, disapprovingly, as nationalist. Marian 
(♂15), in the Romanian city of Timişoara, described Russia as ‘very conservative, and they are 
really nationalistic.’ 
 
The great majority of young people spoken to in these discussions were dismissive of nationalism. 
In Haslev (Denmark), Nis (♂17) could say ‘I don’t look at myself as Danish – I know I’m from 
Denmark, and … have a Danish passport – but I’m not very into nationalism.’  Troels (♂18) added ‘I 
don’t really care about concepts of nations – I care more about the people around me than the 
nation I’m from.’  Ilta (♀19) in Helsinki was ‘quite anti-nationalist. I hate it when people emphasise 





Although there was a dominating sense that nationalism was seen as outdated, for older people, 
and often racist, there were many diverse constructions, including variants on this.  Contingent 
factors, at the level of an individual country or a group of countries were significant in contributing 
to how some young people shaped their sense of the nation. In countries that could narrate a 
substantial and long historical account, such as Poland, Iceland and Turkey young people 
sometimes would identify key moments with some sense of national pride.  In some countries 
with a less consistent independent history, young people often expressed less strong identification 
with the country, as in say Slovakia and Slovenia: and where there was a tradition of 
independence, as in Iceland and Poland, then this was often foregrounded as a characteristic of 
national identity.  Where there was a narrative of oppression and external dominance, the 
persistence of a sense of national identity, or survival, was sometimes celebrated and used as a 
marker to differentiate from a neighbour who became the other (as in the case of Bulgaria with 
the Ottomans, for example; or Poland and Hungary with the USSR). Where there was a 
checkerboard of ethnic or national settlements, national identities sometimes became expressed 
in irredentist terms (such as ‘reclaiming’ a greater Serbia, or of the Magyarkodo [Greater Hungary] 
groups): but these were more often described as characteristic of older generations.  Where the 
struggle to establish current independence had been both violent and recent, then there was 
often a greater sense of specific national identity.     
 
Older people ‘have a much greater sense of being together, more bound together as a nation,’ 
said Jolanka (♀15) in Pécs (Hungary), ‘because they survived these things together,’ referring to 
both World War 11 and the subsequent Soviet domination.  Fábián (♂15) said they had 
‘experienced what it is like when someone wants to deprive them of their Hungarian nationality.’  
There were very similar observations in Poland, where some young people followed their elders 
attachment to the national history of division and oppression: in Warszawa Klaudia (♀16)said she 
‘felt connected to Poland and to the history, for example, when there are some ceremonies, when 
Young Europeans’ construction of nation, state, country … page 11 
I recall upon the history of this nation, there is an emotion in me.’  On the other hand, some young 
Poles, such as Rostek (♀16, in the same group) rejected this as ‘very egotistical -   Poles always 
think that they suffered more that anyone else – we are so patriotic.’ 
In the Baltic states and in the western Balkans there were particular conditions were families had 
been caught in boundary changes, so that they found themselves no longer living in their state of 
origin: those of Russian nationality living in the Baltic states, and those who were formerly 
Yugoslavians now living in a new Balkan states.  
 
In the Baltic states there were substantial Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia, many 
of whom have a distinctive citizenship status as aliens or non-citizens, with Russian nationality 
recorded on their Estonian or Latvian passports. Many were regarded with suspicion by young 
Estonians and Latvians: they retained their Russian language, attended separate schools. In Latvian 
and Lithuanian schools that had both Latvian or Lithuanian pupils and russkiye and part-russkiye 
students, there was a large degree of acceptance and minimising of difference. This was not so 
where there were separate language schools in Estonia and parts of Latvia, exacerbated by fears of 
being taken again by Russia (the examples of Georgia and the Ukraine being mentioned).  Many 
Russians had integrated, however: in Jūrmala, Matiss (♂13) was proud to be Latvian: ‘I am Russian 
– I am born in Latvia, and I feel like a Latvian. I speak pretty good Latvian, my friends are Latvian, 
and my dad is Latvian. … I don’t feel I am Russian.’ Monta (♀15) (also with a Russian mother), was 
more ambivalent : ‘I don’t think I’m Russian, but I also don’t count myself Latvian.’ 
 
Brubaker (1996) characterised these Baltic Russians, and similarly placed internal migrants in 
Yugoslavia, as reframed: finding themselves potentially reclassified as non-nationals in a state that 
had just come into existence. The animosities in the Balkans were longstanding, reflecting both 
Bosnian-Serbian differences in World War Two and the subsequent Serbian hegemony in Tito’s 
Yugoslavia and in the wars of the 1990s. One school in Ljubljana, Slovenia, had many young people 
of Serbia, Croatian and Bosnian origins, some of whom felt ostracised because of these histories. 
Ana (♀12, of Serbian heritage) said some young Slovenes ‘still are very much focussed on the past, 
and according to this they are blaming people.’  They particularly emphasised how it was their 
grandparents, and sometimes their parents, who were nationalistic,: Nika (12♂), Montenegrin 
origin) said ‘the older they are, the more religious they are, and the more nationalist,’ and Ema 
(♀12, Slovene/Croat) said ‘my grandfather is Croatian, and he feel this stronger than being 
Slovenian, though he lives in Slovenia.’  This lead sometimes to problems in school – ‘not always,’ 
said  Žiga (♂13, Serbian origin), ‘there are always good people, no matter from which nationality, 
from which country. Because of the wars, when their parents are mad with other nationalities, like 
Serbia and Bosnia, and they think that Serbia, for example, is a bad country, and then they teach 
their kids to think the same way as they do. So there are problems like that in school, they don’t 
want to be friends with you.’   
 
There were similar issues in Croatia, with young people’s sense of nationalism vicariously refracted 
through their parents’ experience of the war of independence (1991-95, against the ‘Yugoslav’ 
Serb forces).  In Zagreb, Radoš (♂14) said he didn’t care much about his Croatian nationality 
‘because I was not affected by the war. I was just born in independent Croatia - it doesn’t affect 
me in any way.’  Morana (♀14) differed. ‘My dad was in the war – he is alive, thank God -  but he 
went through really a lot, and I am proud of him, really grateful, and I think that all Croatians 
should be. He was ready to sacrifice his life for the country and the next generations - it’s a shame 
when a young Croatian says that he doesn’t feel anything about our history.’ But the war had only 
directly affected a minority, and most young people were less concerned with nationality (Ross, 
Puzić and Doolan, 2017).   
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One final, and rather different, example of a contextual variation came from Norway, where some 
group discussions took place in 2014,  two years after the massacre of 77 young people at Utøya 
by the far-right terrorist Anders Behring Breivik. Some of the young people had friends who had 
been involved, or had fortuitously missed attending the event. They stressed how their sense of 
Norwegian nationality had been enhanced by the state and country’s reaction to the event:   
Lovinda (♀17), in Lillehammer, said ‘we stand together as a nation – when we had the terror thing 
a couple of years ago, we all went together with roses, and you kind of felt – it was so Norwegian – 
everyone stood together, and no one was angry in that way that we wanted to hurt other people, 
or be mean and unfair. I felt – it’s kind of weird to say – but I felt we became closer as a nation. I 
love my country even more because of the way we handled everything.’  Kine (♀18) added ‘you 
know, just holding each other’s hands, hugging – being there for each other in that difficult time.’  
Lovinda then suggested that ‘If this had happened in America, he would have got the death 





In general, young Europeans in this age cohort, at this time, were critical of the concept of having a 
‘national identity’, which they associated with far-right wing political parties and (often) older 
people. They did, however, show some identification with their country, and often with the socio-
political structures of their state, such as health and welfare provision, which was sometimes 
contrasted favourably with the situation in United States.  Citizenship identity was not infrequently 
seen as a matter of chance, rather than as an essentialised construction of national characteristics.  
There was little evidence of variations between classes or genders on the issues of nationalism, 
though there were on other issues not considered on this article (for instance, young men and 
more middle-class young people tended to initially construct Europe in instrumental terms of 
freedom to travel and study).  
Their identities were seen as with a wide spectrum of political locations, from the institutions of 
the local area, sometimes the province, the state and with Europe, and sometimes global.  Europe  
was constructed as an identity by many young people, initially in the discussions as an 
instrumental identity (giving freedom of travel, perhaps for work, but more often for education); 
but as discussions continued Europe was seen as a location for valued and rights that they 
considered important. These tended to be rights that were still sometimes matters for dispute, in 
Europe and in other states in the world – concerning, for example, women’s rights., LBGT issues, 
refugee and migrant rights, and anti-racism. ‘Nationalism’ was seen as explicitly constructed, as a 
mythic story that was no longer needed as a social narrative. Nationalist parties were frequently 
mentioned, almost always in negative terms: there appeared to be very little evidence of young 
people supporting extreme nationalist parties.  
 
There were contextual exceptions to these generalisations.  In some western Balkan states, and in 
Turkey, there was often an essentialised construct of nationality, with references to lineage and 
blood lines.  Some of this arose from memories of recent conflicts, especially in the western 
Balkans, and some from more distant recollections of combat.  This was sometimes linked to 
symbols such as the national flag, for example in Turkey. 
 
But there were particular local turns to all of these understandings of nationalism as a construct.  
In the Visegrád states, for example, there was a real awareness of why previous generations had 
developed and tenaciously clung to the myth of the unitary and homogeneous nation: it was such 
beliefs that held their grandparents’ generation together in the face of the Nazi invasion of the 
1940s, and when the USSR dominated the region during the Cold War.  But the young people of 
this study largely appeared to feel that this sense of a nation was now outmoded, and unnecessary 
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now their state was firmly within the European Union and NATO. While the nation was generally 
seen as passé, this did not mean that most young people did not show an affection for their 
country, and an appreciation of the state they lived in (the latter particularly evident in 
Scandinavia and north-western Europe); but most of them distinguished this from, and disavowed, 
nationalism.    
 
And a construct of Europe – hazily defined, taking in aspects of both the European Union and the 
Council of Europe – appears to be emerging in the minds of many young people of a community, 
defined by some shared political and social values, rights-based, fluid and at times fractious.  This 
is not another form of the nation, nor of a state, but it has elements of the imagined community of 
Benedict Anderson: Olesia’s (a 12 year old Polish young woman in Kraków) description of feeling 
European was that: 
 
everywhere you go you are surrounded by your friends, people from the same group – I 
can go anywhere, to any country and they would know … you are from Europe. They don’t 
know you, but they know you – you are like a distant relative. Being European means that 
everywhere you have neighbours … In Europe, everyone has awareness, they know about 
each other, where each country is. 
 
This European dimension appears to constitute an additional identity, but, I would suggest, is not 
in itself responsible for the rejection of nationalism.  There were no references to ‘European 
citizenship’ as such, or any analogous term: the Maastricht/Lisbon creation of a European 
Citizenship did not appear to register with any of the groups.  Yet Goethe’s 1792 observation of 
the ‘new epoch’ of world history, in the European context, appears to have lasted little more than 
two centuries.  
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